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ABSTRACT 
A country's electoral system can have a sign ificant innuence on voting behaviour and on the existence and structure of political 
parties . It should take into account that country's history and current circumstances, so that it can be conducive to a satisfactory 
balance between all differences in a nation's society. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the existing voting systems in Germany 
and in New Zealand, highlighting the merits and demerits of them. The main focus is given to the mathematical formulas to calculate 
the number of seats that belong to a certain political party according to its party votes, the possibility of overhanging seats occurring, 
and the different possibilities for the solution of this problem. The consequences of the introduction of New Zealand's current electoral 
system are taken into consideration. This analysis concludes that the Mixed System of (Simple) Majority Vote and Proportional 
Representation (MMP) electoral system guarantees a Parliament that renects the diversities of a society besides giving voters the 
possibility of innuencing its personal composition. It is found that the mathematical formula Sainte Lague is preferable, that 
overhanging seats occurring should, as at present, be tolerated without any measures of compensation, that only directly elected 
candidates should reoccupy vacated overhanging seats, that voters should be given a second choice concerning their party votes, and 
that the electoral system MMP in New Zealand can result in political circumstances as stable as FPP. It is recommended that Germany 
adopts the mathematical formula Sainte Lague. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, abstract, tables , footnotes and bibliography) comprises approximately 14,7 l 0 
words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
All voting systems have to find a solution for the conflict between proportional 
representation - Parliament should represent the whole population's will - and 
efficiency - majorities are needed for effective work in Parliament and to secure 
stability. 
In general, there are two maJor groups of voting systems: the proportional 
representation voting system and the majority voting system. In theory, the possible 
variations of these systems are numerous. 
A The Majority Voting System 
"The winner takes it all ... " The majority voting system focuses more on efficiency 
than on a proportional representation. There are as many voting districts as seats. The 
majority voting system is conducive to majorities in Parliament and to a two-party-
system. It is almost impossible for new political parties to establish themselves. 
Another disadvantage of this system is that the votes of the electors do not have the 
same weight: all votes for losing candidates are lost. A voting result is not 
representative of a population's voting behaviour. It could happen that the political 
party with the majority in Parliament did not earn the majority of all votes in a country. 
B The Proportional Voting System 
The proportional voting system is based on the principle "one man one vote". Each 
vote should have the same weight in the election's result. This voting system focuses 
on a proportional representation - the political parties obtain a certain number of seats 
that corresponds to the percentage of votes they have obtained in the elections. 
The aim of this electoral system is to truly represent the whole society in Parliament. 
The most serious problem related to this system consists of the possible difficulty of 
reaching a majority in Parliament. 
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In the twentieth century, there has been a trend for electoral systems to shift from the 
majority voting system to the proportional voting system. 1 
II MIXED SYSTEM OF (SIMPLE) MAJORITY VOTE AND PROPORTIONAL 
REPRESENTATION (MMP) 
A Introduction 
The Mixed System of (Simple) Majority Vote and Proportional Representation 
(MMP) currently applies in Bolivia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand 
and Venezuela.2 After the second world war, Germany adopted its current voting 
system; it is ruled by the Bundeswahlgesetz (BWahlG). In New Zealand, MMP came 
into force in 1994; it is ruled by the Electoral Act 1993. It is based on the German 
voting system. 
This voting system consists of a combination of elements of the proportional voting 
system and the majority voting system. Each elector has two votes: one for a political 
party and another for a certain candidate in an electoral district. Referring to the latter, 
the candidate who obtains the highest number of votes in an electoral district becomes 
a Member of Parliament pursuant to § 5 BWahlG and section 179 (2) of the Electoral 
Act 1993. Thus, this vote can be classified as belonging to the majority voting system. 
It gives citizens the possibility to influence the personal composition of their 
Parliament. 
The vote for a political party generally decides the question as to which party enters 
Parliament and, in the case where it does, the number of seats in Parliament that 
belong to the party. The voting system that applies to the party vote is the proportional 
voting system. The electors do not have any influence on the candidates who are put 
forward on the list, as the political parties decide upon the ranking order of their 
candidates on the lists themselves. 
1 Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation (Ashgate, 
Christchurch, 1998) 2. 
2 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance IDEA 
<http://www.idea.int/escl/data/type.cfm?electoralSystem=MMP> (last accessed 24 September 2003). 
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Once both votes are given, the question of their influence on the political and 
personal composition of Parliament arises. Pursuant to § 6 N BWahlG and 
section 192 (2) of the Electoral Act 1993, the number of candidates elected by the 
electorate vote is subtracted from the number of seats gained by a political party from 
its party votes. 
An example will make this clearer: If 10 candidates were directly elected in their 
electoral districts by the electorate vote and the result of the party vote of that political 
party is the number of 40 seats in Parliament, then the 10 directly elected candidates 
will enter Parliament in addition to 30 candidates from that parties list. 
Additionally, Germany due to its federalism has opted for a two-staged distribution 
of seats obtained by the party vote. After the total number of seats for a certain 
political party at a national level is calculated, these seats are distributed among the 
different lists of the Bundeslander of that party according to§ 7 BWahlG. 
B Possible Alternatives to MMP 
Some critics3 of MMP argue that the electorate vote should be abrogated. They 
reason that the electorate vote is inappropriate to ensure that electors influence the 
personal composition of Parliament.4 Electors would only be capable of substituting a 
list candidate by a direct candidate of the same political party. Also, it would not be 
reasonable that non-voters of political parties could influence their personal 
composition in Parliament.5 In their opinion, a real influence on the personal 
composition of Parliament is given by the Single Transferable Vote (STV)6 system as 
a real combination of the proportional and the majority voting system. 7 
1 Single Transferable Vote (STV) 
3 Martin Fehndrich for example. Verbessemngen for das Bundeswahlgesetz 
<http ://www.wahlrecht.de/ueberhang/besseres.htm> (last accessed 19 September 2003). 
4 Verbesserungen for das Bundeswahlgesetz, above. 
5 Verbesserungen fur das Bundeswahlgesetz, above. 
6 For a detailed description of this method see Wikipedia 
<http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Transferable_ Vote> (last accessed 19 September 2003) or 
Wellington City Council <http ://www.wcc.govt.nz/council/elections/stv-voting/> (last accessed 19 
September 2003). 
7 Verbesserungen fur das Bundeswahlgesetz, above. 
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Thus, it has to be asked whether the STY voting system is preferable in comparison 
to MMP. STY also was the subject of a closer scmtiny by the Royal Commission on 
the Electoral System in New Zealand. 8 It is based on proportional representation, but 
electors vote for individual candidates in order of their preferences instead of voting 
for a party list. 9 The model analysed by the Royal Commission additionally provides a 
"party box" above the list of candidates of each registered party, so that voters have the 
option of either marking one party box or of numbering the candidates of the same or 
different parties in order of their preferences. 10 In contrast to MMP, STY aims to 
minimize the political parties' influence in the elections. 11 The voters' first 
preferences are considered first, whereupon the candidates who reach a certain "quota" 
are elected. If a candidate achieves more votes than required, a proportion of each of 
"his" votes is transferred to the candidate of the second choice and so on. 12 The 
electors are not required to indicate more than one preference, but marking more 
preferences would naturally be to the voter's advantage. 13 This system principally 
presents the advantages that it is proportional, that the electors can choose 
representatives that have a strong tie to their interests, and that tactical thoughts when 
voting are avoided as most votes do not get "wasted". 14 
On the other hand, there are also disadvantages related to it. First, the counting of 
votes is more complicated and time-consuming than with other electoral systems. 
Also, there could be an excessive demand on the voters given the case that they are not 
familiar with the candidates. This problem would not be given with the proposed 
"party box", where voters could just tick a certain political party indicating acceptance 
of that party's candidates in that order. But STY could also cause illogical results. An 
example is the composition of Malta's Parliament in 1981. Here, the Nationalists 
obtained 50.9 per cent of first-preference votes and gained 31 seats, whereas the 
Labour Party gained 34 seats with only 49.1 per cent of first-preference votes. This 
8 Royal Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [1986-87] IX AJHR H.3 
38. 
9 The Single Transferable Vote (STY) <http ://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/gstv.htm> (last accessed 19 
September 2003). 
10 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above, 44, 45. 
11 Vernon Bogdanor What is Proportional Representation ? (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1984) 77. 
12 Wellington City Council <http://www.wcc.govt.nz/council/elections/stv-voting/> (last accessed 19 
September 2003). 
13 Bogdanor, above, 81. 
14 STY <http://www.wahlrecht.de/lexikon/stv.htmJ> (last accessed 19 September 2003). 
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circumstance was given because the Nationalists had more "wasted" votes compared 
I -to the Labour Party. ) 
But one of the most important disadvantages is that this voting system 1s not 
practicable with a higher number of candidates. 16 As this would be very likely in 
Germany, STY is not suitable there. Regarding New Zealand, this system might 
theoretically be equal to MMP in merits and demerits. But the Royal Commission 
concluded in its analysis that MMP is clearly superior for New Zealand. 17 In their 
opinion, issues like a more effective Parliament, an effective representation of 
minorities such as Maori, and merits in terms of voter participation and legitimacy are 
more likely under MMP. 18 
Referring to MMP, the critics ' argument that voters under this system cannot 
influence the personal composition of Parliament is not convincing. In Germany, half 
of the Members of Parliament are directly elected. New Zealand presents an even 
higher number with 57.5 per cent of directly elected candidates in the 4ih 
Parliament. 19 
Here, the voters have the possibility to elect the candidate they think would best 
represent their interests. Also, it was criticised that non-voters of a party could 
influence their personal composition. This argument is quite contradictory considering 
that the same author expressed that voters could not adequately influence the personal 
composition of Parliament. Besides, it is an advantage of MMP that the electors can 
choose a candidate whose party they might not prefer. This vote does not affect their 
preferred parties chances. Thereby it can be guaranteed that voters really choose 
between the direct candidates. 
2 Supplementary Member (SM) 
15 Bogdanor, above, 97. 
16 STV <http: //www.wahlrecht.de/lexikon/stv.html> (last accessed 19 September 2003). 
17 Royal Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [1986-87] IX AJHR H.3 
63. 
18 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above, 63 . 
19 New Zealand 's electoral system <http://www.elections.org.nz/elections/esyst/govt_ elect.html> (last 
accessed 19 September 2003) . 
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The Royal Commission on the Electoral System also dealt with the Supplementary 
Member (SM) voting system. 20 This system appears similar to the MMP voting 
system. The electors also have two votes, one for a local MP and another for a party. 
The difference to MMP is that the allocation of the list seats is independent from the 
number of seats belonging to a certain party according to the electorate vote. 21 Under 
SM only list seats are allocated proportionally. 22 This means that the larger parties 
obtain more seats overall than they would merely through the party vote. Therefore 
they have an advantage over the smaller parties.23 The conclusion of the Royal 
Commission in terms of SM was that it is "a palliative rather than a true prescription 
for improvement." SM does not overcome the main deficiencies of plurality. 24 
3 First-Past- the-Post (FFP) 
Prior to the MMP voting system, the First-Past-the-Post (FFP) voting system 
applied in New Zealand. An interesting question to consider is whether MMP 
represents a better choice than the anterior voting system. 
In the First-Past-the-Post (FPP) voting system the candidate(s) with the highest 
number(s) of votes become(s) a Member of Parliament. The electors have as many 
votes as there are seats for their electoral district. 25 There are some aspects that could 
strongly speak in favour of this voting system: it is very easy to understand and it 
clearly shows the success of the single candidates of a political party. 26 Also, forming 
a new government after an election does not require a relatively long period of time as 
under MMP.27 But there are also important disadvantages related to this voting 
system. Political parties may concentrate their electoral campaign and efforts on areas 
20 Royal Conunission on the Electoral System, above, 38. 
21 Green <http: //www.greens.org.nz/searchdocs/PR3577.htm1> (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
22 Elections <http: //www.elections.org.nz/elections/pandr/eglossary.htm.l> (last accessed 25 September 
2003). 
23 Green, above. 
2
-1 Royal Conunission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [ 1986-87] IX AJHR H.3 
63. 
25 Wellington City Council <http: //www.wcc.govt.nz/council/elections/stv-voting/> (last accessed 19 
September 2003). 
26 Enviro1unent Canterbury <http: //www.ecan.govt.nz/about-us/stv.htm.l> (last accessed 23 June 2003). 
27 Hon Sir John Wallace "Reflections on Constitutional and other issues concerning our electoral 
system: the past and the future" in David Carter and Matthew Palmer ( ed) Roles and Perspectives in 
the Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Jvor Richardson (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2002) 297, 
303. 
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that demonstrate a better winning chance. This could lead to very unequal chances to 
enter Parliament. Political parties, which are widespread over a bigger region, would 
be disadvantaged in comparison to those that are successful in a particular smaller 
area. Therefore the FPP system contributes to the regionalism of an election. 28 
Furthermore, the possibility is given that some voters did not vote for any of the 
elected candidates. From 1954, all Governments in New Zealand were elected "with 
the support of fewer than half the voters."29 Also, minorities would normally be 
underrepresented among the candidates for an election.30 Thus, the result of an 
election would often not reflect the range of the increasingly diverse opinions that 
exist across the whole electorate. 31 This problem exists with any possible voting 
method, but the threshold of five per cent (MMP) mitigates it to a minimum in order 
to guarantee a functioning Parliament. MMP presents the desirable characteristic of an 
almost proportional result, while voters can also influence the personal composition of 
Parliament. 
Thus, MMP presents the advantage of a proportional Parliament in addition to the 
possibility of the electors influencing the personal composition of Parliament. 
Out of the STY, the SM and the FPP voting systems, none is necessarily preferable to 
MMP. 
C Mathematical Formulas 
Once an election was held and all the given votes were count, there are different 
methods of calculating the number of seats in Parliament belonging to the political 
parties according to the number of votes they obtained. In Germany the formula of 
Hare/Niemeyer has replaced the formula d'Hondt; the Sainte-Lague fommla applies 
in New Zealand. 
I Hare/Niemeyer 
28 Law Conmtission of Canada <http ://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/gr/er/er_background.asp> (last 
accessed 23 June 2003). 
29 Royal Conunission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [1986-87] IX AJHR H.3 
14. 
30 Law Commission of Canada, above. 
3 1 Environment Canterbury <http://www.ecan.govt.nz/about-us/stv.html> (last accessed 23 June 2003) . 
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The Hare/Niemeyer formula is also known as, among others, the Hamilton 
procedure, the largest remainder or Vinton's method of 1850.32 It is a procedure 
developed by the American politicians Alexander Hamilton (1755 - 1804) and 
Samuel Vinton (1792 - 1862), the English lawyer Thomas Hare (1806 - 1891) and 
the German mathematician Horst Niemeyer (* 1928). 33 It has already applied for the 
occupation of the committees in the German Reichstag. 34 
This formula consists of two steps pursuant to § 6 II BWahlG. In the first step the 
sum of all votes for a political party are multiplied by the total number of seats in 
Parliament and divided by the sum of all valid votes for political parties that passed 
the threshold of five per cent. The resulting whole number is the number of seats in 
Parliament for that party. 
The following example will make this clearer: if the number resulting from the 
calculation described above is 7.5 for party A; 12.1 for party B and 9.8 for party C 
then 7 seats will be given to party A, 12 to party B and 9 to party C in the first step. 
The second step aims to distribute seats that were left after the first step was taken. 
These seats are given to the parties with the highest numbers after the decimal point.35 
In the example given above party C would first receive another seat; the second one 
would belong to party A. 
(a) Merits 
One argument speaking in favour of this formula is that it uses a proportional 
calculation in the first step. Therefore its application is transparent and appears 
plausible.36 Also, political parties are not exposed to any advantages or disadvantages 
depending on their largeness when Hare/Niemeyer is used. 37 
(b) Demerits 
32 Hare/Niemeyer <http://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/hare-niemeyer.html> (last accessed 29 June 
2003). 
33 Hare/Niemeyer <http://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/hare-niemeyer.htmb (last accessed 29 June 
2003). 
34 Deutscher Bundestag <http://wwww.bundetag.de/gremien/l431 /azur/azur_2.htm1> (last accessed 14 
July 2003). 
35 Hare/Niemeyer, above. 
36 Deutscher Bundestag, above. 
37 Hare/Niemeyer, above. 
10 
The application of the Hare/Niemeyer formula implicates several important 
disadvantages. 
(i) "Illogical jumps" (Alabama paradox) 
One of these disadvantages is the possibility of the so-called "illogical jumps". This 
problem is also known as the Alabama paradox .38 It consists of the following: The 
circumstance that a certain committee is enlarged from for example sixteen to 
seventeen seats could have the surprising consequence that a seat, which was already 
assigned to a certain political party (in a committee of sixteen seats), is being lost 
again for that party with an enlargement of the committee (to seventeen seats). 39 
The following example will make this clearer: If a committee has 16 seats that need 
to be distributed according to the voting result to the different political parties and the 
total amount of valid votes is 356, from which party A obtained 203 votes, party B 
119 and party C 34, party A would obtain 9 seats, party B 5 seats and party C 2 seats 
according to this formula. 
Now, if the committee is enlarged by one seat and the total number of seats to be 
distributed is 17, the allocation of seats with the same distribution of votes among the 
political parties would be the following: 10 seats for party A, 6 seats for party B and 
only 1 seat for party C.40 This absurd result is obtained by the following calculation 
according to Hare/Niemeyer: 
Total amount of valid votes: 356. Party A: 203 votes; party B: 119 votes; party C: 
34 votes. 
Seats to be distributed: 16 seats. 
A: 203 x l6 = 9.12 ... 
356 
B: 119x l6 = 5.34.. . C: 34x16 = 1.52 .. . 
356 356 
38 Alabama-Paradoxon <http ://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/paradoxien/alabama.html> (last accessed 
15 July 2003). 
39 Deutscher Bundestag <http ://www.bundestag. de/gremien/ l 43 1/azur/azur _ 2. html> (last accessed 14 
July 2003). 
40 Deutscher Bundestag, above. 
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First step: 
Party A: 9 seats Party B: 5 seats Party C: 1 seat 
15 seats were distributed in the first step, so that there is one more seat to be 
distributed in the second step. It belongs to party C because it obtained the highest 
number after the decimal point. Therefore the result is the following: 
Party A: 9 seats Party B: 5 seats Party C: 2 seats 
When the committee is enlarged by one seat (17 seats): 
Total amount of valid votes: 356. Party A: 203 votes; party B: 119 votes; party C: 34 
votes. 
Seats to be distributed: 17 seats. 
A: 203xl 7 = 9.66 ... 
356 
First step: 
B: l 19xl 7 = 5.68 ... 
356 
C: 34xl 7 = 1.62 ... 
356 
Party A: 9 seats Party B: 5 seats Party C: 1 seat 
15 seats were distributed in the first step, so that there are two more seats to be 
distributed in the second step. Party A and party B each obtain one more seat because 
they obtained the highest numbers after the decimal point. Therefore the result is the 
following: 
Party A: 10 seats Party B: 6 seats Party C: 1 seat 
The allocation of seats in a committee with 18 seats would be the following: 
Total amount of valid votes: 356. Party A: 203 votes; party B: 119 votes; party C: 34 
votes. 
Seats to be distributed: 18 seats. 
A: 203xl8 = 10.26 ... 
356 
B: 119xl8 = 6.01. .. 
356 
C: 34xl8 = 1.71. .. 
356 
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First step: 
Party A: 10 seats Party B: 6 seats Party C: 1 seat 
17 seats were distributed in the first step, so that there is one more seat to be 
distributed in the second step. It belongs to party C because it obtained the highest 
number after the decimal point. Therefore the result is the following: 
Party A: 10 seats Party B: 6 seats Party C: 2 seats 
As the possibility of an "illogical jump" is related to the Hare/Niemeyer method, it 
is advisable to calculate the allocation of seats for committees that have one seat less 
than the one which is meant to be distributed. This way it could be determined 
whether an "illogical jump" arises. 41 
The "illogical jumps" not only exist in theory. In the German federal elections in 
1998 the Socialists (PDS) obtained 36 of the then 656 seats in the Bundestag.42 
Assuming that the German Parliament had 657 seats, the PDS would have had 
obtained only 35 seats.43 This phenomenon occurred also in the United States of 
America during the end of the 191h century in the elections for the House of 
Representatives. The first "affected" state was Alabama, which is why this problem is 
also called the Alabama paradox. The consequences taken were that the formula 
Hare/Niemeyer was replaced by the Sainte Lague formula. 44 
(ii) New state paradox (Parteizuwachs-Paradoxon) 
Unfortunately, the "illogical jumps" are not the only problem related to the formula 
of Hare/Niemeyer. This formula could also lead to the fact that a certain political 
party loses a seat when the total number of political parties is reduced.45 This 
phenomenon is known as the Parteizuwachs-Paradoxon or the new state paradox. 46 
One of the reasons why the total number of political parties could be reduced is that 
41 Deutscher Bundestag <http ://www.bundestag.de/gremien/1431 /azur/azur_2.html> (last accessed 14 
July 2003) . 
42 "Overhanging seats" not included. 
43 Alabama-Paradoxon <http: //www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/paradoxien/alabama.html> (last accessed 
15 July 2003). 
44 Alabama-Paradoxon, above. 
45 Parteizu wachs-Paradoxon <http ://www. wahlrecht. de/verfahren/paradoxien/parteizu wachs.html> ( last 
accessed 16 July 2003). 
46 Parteizuwachs-Paradoxon, above. 
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the German Federal Constitutional Court could declare a political party as 
unconstitutional. 
To make this phenomenon clearer an example will be given: 
Given that there are 21 seats in a committee to be distributed and the total amount of 
valid votes is 1 OOO, from which party A and party B both obtained 440, party C 70 
and party D 50 votes, the result of the calculation according to Hare/Niemeyer would 
be the following: 
A: 9.24 ... B: 9.24 ... C: 1.47 ... D: 1.05 ... 
Thus, in the first step 9 seats will be given to party A and B each and 1 seat to party C 
and D each. The number of seats distributed in the first step is 20. Therefore there is 
one remaining seat in the second step, which will be given to party C because of its 
highest number after the decimal point. The final result would be A: 9 seats, B: 9 
seats, C: 2 seats and D: 1 seat. 
Assuming that the German Federal Constitutional Court would declare party D as 
unconstitutional, the calculation would result in the following numbers: 
A: 9.72 ... B: 9.72 ... C: 1.54 ... D: -
This means that 9 seats belong to party A and B each and 1 belongs to party C in the 
first step. Therefore there are 2 more seats to be distributed in the second step. These 
will be given to parties A and B because of their highest numbers after the decimal 
point. Thus, the final result would be A: I O seats, B : 10 seats and C: 1 seat.
47 
As can be observed, party C obtained only one seat instead of two when the votes for 
party D were not taken into consideration. Party C is therefore obtaining more seats 
when party D is included in the calculation despite the fact that the seats are 
distributed between more political parties.
48 Such a result is not desirable and 
absolutely inequitable. 
47 Parteizuwachs-Paradoxon <http://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/paradoxien/parteizuwachs.html> (last 
accessed 16 July 2003). 
48 Parteizuwachs-Paradoxon, above. 
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(iii) Population paradox (Wahlerzuwachs-Paradoxon) 
Furthennore, the formula Hare/Niemeyer presents the so-called Wahlerzuwachs-
Paradoxon or population paradox.49 This is another not convincing aspect of this 
method. This problem occurs when it is assumed that a certain political party earns 
more or less votes than it really did in the elections. This variation would have the 
consequence for other political parties that they could win or lose seats in 
Parliament. 50 
The election for the Bundestag (German Parliament) in 1998 will be used as an 
example to assure that this idea is understood. The result of this election was as 
follows: 51 
Total amount of votes 
CDU: 14004908 
(Christian Democrat Union) 
CSU: 3324480 
(Christian Social Union) 
FDP: 3080955 
(Liberal Democrat Party) 
SPD: 20181269 
(Social Democrat Party) 
B90 I Grune: 3301624 
(Green Party) 
PDS: 2515454 
(Socialist Party) 
Total: 46408690 
Calculation result 
197.96 ... 
46.99 ... 
43.550 ... 
285.26 ... 
46.66 ... 
35.556 .. . 
Number of seats in Parliament by 1998: 656 
Therefore, the following numbers of seats m Parliament were allocated to the 
different parties: 
49 Population-Paradoxon <http://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/paradoxien/population.html> (last 
accessed 16 July 2003). 
50 Population-Paradoxon, above. 
51 Population-Paradoxon, above. 
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First step Second step Result 
CDU: 197 + 1 198 
CSU: 46 + 1 47 
FDP: 43 43 
SPD: 285 285 
B90 I Grune: 46 + 1 47 
PDS: 35 + 1 36 
Total: 652 656 
Assuming that the party CDU had obtained 38,000 less votes than it did in the 
election, the result looks different: 
Total amount of votes 
CDU: 13966908 
CSU: 3324480 
FDP: 3080955 
SPD: 20181269 
B90 I Grune: 3301624 
PDS: 2515454 
Total: 46370690 
Calculation result 
197.5879 ... 
47.03 ... 
43.58586 .. . 
285.50 .. . 
46.70 .. . 
35.58579 ... 
Thus, the following numbers of seats in Parliament would have been allocated to the 
different parties: 
First step 
CDU: 197 
CSU: 47 
FDP: 43 
SPD: 285 
B90 I Grune: 46 
PDS: 35 
Total: 653 
Second step 
+ 1 
+ 1 
+ 1 
Result 
198 
47 
44 
285 
47 
35 
656 
It can be observed that in the first example with the real results the party PDS 
obtained 36 seats and the party FDP obtained 43 of them. Presuming that the party 
16 
CDU had obtained 38,000 less votes than it really did, the party FDP would have 
earned one more seat ( 44 seats) and the party PDS one seat less (35 seats). 
(iv) Negative weight of votes (negatives Stimmgewicht) 
The population paradox should not be confused with the problem called negatives 
Stimmgewicht or the negative weight of votes, where more votes for a political party 
could have the absolutely absurd consequence that this party loses seats in 
Parliament. 52 Whatever should be required from a mathematical formula, all should 
naturally guarantee that a vote for a certain political party does not lead to a loss of 
seats for that party. On the other hand, it should also be guaranteed that a party does 
not obtain more seats for obtaining less votes in an election. There are several cases of 
the negative weight of votes using the formula Hare/Niemeyer. 
( aa) Sperrklauselparadoxon 
One of these cases is the so-called Sperrklauselparadoxon. 53 
It occurs when (party) votes are added to the ones a political party obtained, so that 
this party obtains a higher amount of votes and when this has the consequence that 
another political party fails to pass the threshold of five per cent of all valid votes. 
Then the party, which obtained more votes, surprisingly loses seats in Parliament.54 
This can be observed at the following example: 
The total number of seats to be distributed is 21. If the total amount of valid votes is 
10,000, from which 
party A obtained 500 
party B 700 
party C 4400 and 
party D 4400, 
the numbers obtained using the Hare/Niemeyer formula are 
A: 1.05 
52Population-Paradoxon, above. 
53 egatives Stimmgewicht <http://www.wahlrecht.de/systemfehler/index.html> (last accessed 16 July 
2003). 
54 Spenklausel-Paradoxon <http://www.wahlrecht.de/systemfehler/spenklausel.htm> (last accessed 29 
June 2003). 
B: 1.47 
C: 9.24 
D: 9.24. 
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Thus, party A would receive 1 seat, party B 2 seats and the parties C and D 9 seats 
each. 
Now, if the total amount of votes raises to 10,001 and the additional vote is given to 
party B, party A would not pass the threshold of five per cent of the total amount of 
valid votes. The numbers obtained by using the formula Hare-Niemeyer would be the 
following: 
party A: - (under five per cent) 
party B: 1.54 
party C: 9.72 and 
party D: 9.72. 
Therefore, party B would obtain 1 and parties C and D 9 seats each in the first step. In 
the second step, the two remaining seats will be given to parties C and D (as these 
have the highest numbers after the decimal point). The final distribution of seats will 
thus be: no seats for party A, 1 seat for party B and 10 seats for parties C and D each. 
It can be seen that party B loses a seat in this example when it wins an additional 
vote.ss 
(bb) Direktmandats-Paradoxon 
Another case of the negative weight of votes 1s known as the Direktmandats-
Paradoxon. 56 
This problem can occur with the loss of an electoral district for a certain political 
party. This lost electoral district could have the consequence of an additional seat in 
Parliament for the affected party. Again, an example should clarify this idea: 
The German Parliament has 598 seats. If it is imagined that the electoral district XY 
was won by party C and the total amount of votes was 598,000, from which party A 
55 Sperrklausel-Paradoxon <http://www.wahlrecht.de/systemfehler/sperrklausel.htrm (last accessed 29 
June 2003). 
56 Sperrklausel-Paradoxon, above. 
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obtained 288,700, party B 270,700, party C 38,600 and the independent candidate D 0 
votes, then the numbers obtained by Hare/Niemeyer would have been the following: 
party A: 288.7 
party B: 270. 7 
party C: 38.6. 
Thus, party A would have obtained 289 seats according to this formula, party B 271, 
party C 38 and independent candidate D 0. 
If we now change the situation by giving the electoral district XY to the independent 
candidate D, the numbers obtained would be: 
party A: 288.21 
party B: 270.14 
party C: 38.53. 
The seats in Parliament would be distributed as follows: party A 288 seats, party B 
270 seats, party C 39 seats and independent candidate D 1 seat. 
Thus, party C obtains one more seat in Parliament (39 instead of 38) when it does not 
win the electoral district XY. Winning an electoral district could thus have the absurd 
consequence for a party that it loses seats in Parliament. 57 
(cc) Statewide overhanging seats 
Another problem in this group is the one related to the interne Uberhangmandate 
(statewide overhanging seats). 58 This problem is specifically related to Germany as a 
federal state with a special provision ruling the sub-distribution of seats of the 
different political parties in the federal Parliament between the different Lander 
(states). §§ 7 III, 6 II BWahlG mle how the seats a certain political party obtained 
nationwide must be distributed among the different lists of the Lander. 
If it is assumed that the list of one Land obtains more votes, it could happen that the 
total number of seats belonging to that party in Par! iament decreases. 59 
57 Sperrklausel-Paradoxon <http://www.wahlrecht.de/systemfehler/sperrklausel.htrm (last accessed 29 
June 2003). 
58 Systemfehler wegen mangelnder Konsistenz 
<http://www.wahlrecht.de/systemfehler/konsistenz.htm> (last accessed 21 August 2003). 
59 Systernfehler wegen mangelnder Konsistenz, above. 
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The following example provides the real numbers obtained by the Social Democrats 
during the Gennan federal elections in 1994. The numbers put in parentheses 
represent the assumption that the Social Democrats obtained 75,000 (party) votes 
more in the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
List of the Party Num- Seats Candidates Overhan- Total 
Land votes bers accor- elected in ging seats number 
obtained ding to electoral of seats 
Hare/ district 
Niemeyer 
Schleswig- 670,791 9.706 10 2 0 10 
Hol. 
Hamburg 389,857 5.641 6 6 0 6 
Niedersachsen 1,938,321 28.045 28 14 0 28 
Bremen 179,311 2.594 2 3 1 
..., 
.J 
(2.583) (3) (0) 
Nordrhein- 4,534,820 65.613 66 40 0 66 
Westfalen (4,609,820) (66.408) 
Hessen 1,296,788 18.763 19 8 0 19 
Rheinl.-Pfalz 955,383 13.823 14 4 0 14 
Baden-Wurtt. 1,742,592 25.213 25 0 0 25 
Bayern 1,983,979 28.706 29 1 0 29 
(28.580) (28) (28) 
Saarland 329,287 4.764 5 5 0 5 
Berlin 663,081 9.594 9 3 0 9 
Mecklenburg- 283,029 4.095 4 2 0 4 
Vor-pommem 
Brandenburg 617,362 8.932 9 12 3 12 
Sachsen-Anh. 502,193 7.266 7 3 0 7 
Thi.iringen 431,940 6.250 6 0 0 6 
Sachsen 621,620 8.994 9 0 0 9 
Total 17,140,354 248.000 248 103 4 252 
(17,215,354) (3) (251) 
Source: Systemfehler wegen mangelnder Konsistenz 
<http ://www.wahlrecht.de/systemfehler/konsistenz.htm> (last accessed 21 August 2003). 
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As can be observed, the problem of the statewide overhanging seats affects the 
number of seats given to the same party in another Bundesland. 60 The Social 
Democrats would have lost one seat in the federal Parliament if they had won 75,000 
votes in Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
(dd) Unterverteilungsparadoxon 
Another error related to the Hare/Niemeyer method and part of the negative weight 
of votes is the so-called Unterverteilungsparadoxon. 61 It is also specifically related to 
Germany as a federal state with the provisions of§§ 7 III, 6 II BWahlG. 
The achievement of more votes for a certain political party in a certain Land could 
have the consequence for that Land that it loses seats in the federal Parliament due to 
the sub-distribution of seats. 
The following example provides the real numbers obtained in the German federal 
elections in 1994. The numbers in parentheses represent the numbers that would have 
been obtained when the Christian Democrats had obtained one more vote in the Land 
Bremen. This additional vote would have had the consequence that the linked lists of 
the Lander of the Christian Democrats obtain one additional seat at the expense of the 
linked lists of the Social Democrats. Due to the different sub-distribution and the 
different situation concerning overhanging seats, the result of this additional vote is 
contrary to what it should be: only the Land that obtained more votes in the 
assumption of an additional vote loses seats in Parliament. Besides this there would 
not have been any other changes to the composition of Parliament. 
60 Systemfehler wegen mangelnder Konsistenz, above. 
6 1 Unterverteilungsparadoxon <http://www.wahlrecht.de/systemfeh1er/unterve1ieilung.htm1> (last 
accessed 29 September 2003). 
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Distribution of seats among the different political parties: 
Number Seats without Overhanging 
Political party Party votes Total 
obtained overhanging seats seats 
SPD 17,127,933 247.520096 248 4 252 
(247.520091) (247) (5) 
CDU 16,089,960 232.52008 232 12 244 
(+l) (16,089,961) (232.52010) (233) (10) (243) 
CSU 3,427,196 49.527 50 50 
FDP 3,258,407 47.088 47 47 
Biindnis90/Griine 3,424,315 49.485 49 49 
PDS 2,066,176 29.858 30 30 
Total 45,393,987 656 656 16 672 
(45,393,988) (15) (671) 
Source: Unterverteilungsparadoxon <http://www.wahlrecht.de/systernfehler/unterverteilung.htmi> (last 
accessed 29 September 2003). 
Looking at the sub-distribution between the different lists of the Christian 
Democrats it can be observed that if an additional vote is assumed in Bremen this has 
the effect that the Lander Baden-Wiirttemberg and Sachsen-Anhalt would obtain 
more list seats. As these Lander obtained overhanging seats the only effect of the 
additional list seats is that the number of overhanging seats is reduced.62 The final 
result of the assumed better result would be that the Christian Democrats lose one seat 
in Parliament (Land Bremen). 63 There would not be any changes concerning the 
number of seats that belong to the Social Democrats. In the example given in 
parentheses, the Social Democrats lose one list seat. In the sub-distribution this leads 
to the fact that the Land Hamburg would only obtain five list seats. As Hamburg 
achieved six electoral districts there would not be any changes to the composition of 
Parliament, but only to the number of overhanging seats. 
64 
62 Unterverteilungsparadoxon, above. 
63 Unterverteilungsparadoxon, above. 
64 Unterverteilungsparadoxon, above. 
Sub-distribution to the CDU-lists of the Lander 
Number Overhan-
Bundesland Party votes Seats Direct seats Total 
obtained ging seats 
Schl.-Holst. 702,367 10.127 10 9 10 
Hamburg 343,398 4.951 5 1 5 
Nieder-
1,957,664 28.227 28 17 28 
sachsen 
Bremen 105,063 1.5149 2 0 2 
(105,064) (1.5214) (1) (1) 
INordrhein-
Westf. 
3,997,317 57.637 58 31 58 
Hessen 1,417,692 20.441 20 14 20 
Rhein I .Pfalz 1,061 ,643 15.307 15 12 15 
Baden-W. 2,458,917 35.455 35 37 2 37 
(35.607) (36) (1) 
Saarland 250,978 3.618 4 0 4 
Berlin 612,217 8.827 9 6 9 
Mecklenb.V. 378,274 5.454 5 7 2 7 
Brandenburg 385,383 5.556 6 0 6 
Sachsen-
589,294 8.497 8 10 2 10 
Anh. 
(8.533) (9) (1) 
Thiiringen 600,440 8.657 9 12 3 12 
Sachsen 1,229,313 17.725 18 21 3 21 
Total: 16,089,960 232 232 12 244 
(16,089,961) (10) (243) 
Source: U nterverteilungsparadoxon <http: //www. wahlrec ht.de/systemfehler/unterverteilung.html> 
(last accessed 29 September 2003). 
Sub-distribution to the SPD-lists of the Lander 
Number Direct 
Bundesland Party votes Seats 
Schl.-Holst. 670,791 
Hamburg 386,857 
Niedersachs. 1,938,321 
Bremen 
rNRW 
Hessen 
179,311 
4,548,820 
1,296,788 
Rheinl.Pfalz 955,383 
Baden-W. 1,742,592 
Bayern 
Saarland 
Berlin 
Mecklenb.V 
or. 
1,983,979 
329,287 
663,081 
283,029 
Brandenburg 617,362 
Sachsen-
478,772 
Anh. 
Thilringen 431,940 
Sachsen 621,620 
Total 17,127,933 
obtained seats 
9.712 
5.6014 
10 
6 
(5.5788) (5) 
28.065 
2.596 
65.864 
18.776 
13.833 
25.231 
28.726 
4.767 
9.600 
4.098 
8.939 
6.932 
6.254 
9.000 
248 
28 
2 
66 
19 
14 
25 
29 
5 
9 
4 
9 
7 
6 
9 
248 
(247) 
2 
6 
(6) 
14 
3 
40 
8 
4 
1 
5 
3 
2 
12 
3 
Overhan-
ging seats 
(1) 
1 
3 
4 
(5) 
Total 
10 
6 
28 
3 
66 
19 
14 
25 
29 
5 
9 
4 
12 
7 
6 
9 
252 
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Source: U ntervertei lungsparadoxon <http://www.wahlrecht.de/systemfehler/unterverteilung. html> (last 
accessed 29 September 2003). 
(c) Judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
The Gern1an Federal Constitutional Court dealt with a constitutional complaint 
against the Hare/Niemeyer formula in 1988.
65 The appellant argued that the utilisation 
of the Hare/Niemeyer formula lead to a violation of the principle of the equality of 
votes guaranteed by art. 38 I 1 of the German Constitution. This principle requires not 
65 BYerfGE 79, J69ff availab le at <http: //www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/dfr/bv079l69.html> (last accessed 
30 September 2003) l. 
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only the equality of all electors, but also an equal outcome for each vote. The 
appellant stated that the formula d'Hondt66 would result in mathematically more 
satisfactory results than the Hare/Niemeyer formula and that therefore only the former 
should be applied. 
The Court observed that, neither with the Hare/Niemeyer formula nor the method 
according to d 'Hondt could an exact equality be reached. It said it is inevitable with 
both formulas that a mathematically perfect result cannot be obtained. 
67 Thus, as none 
of these methods is unproblematic, it would be the freedom of the legislature to 
choose the method it considered the most convenient.68 
2 D 'Hondt 
Another possibility of calculating the seats belonging to a political party is the 
method according to d'Hondt. It has been used for the federal elections in Germany 
until 1983 when it was replaced by the Hare/Niemeyer formula. It still applies in the 
elections of several Lander. This procedure is also known as the "Jefferson 's method" 
and the "Hagenbach-Bischoff procedure."69 It was developed by the American 
president Thomas Jefferson (1743 - 1826), the Belgium lawyer Victor d 'Hondt 
(1841 -1901) and the Swiss physician Eduard Hagenbach-Bischoff (1833- 1910).
70 
This method consists of three different but mathematically equivalent procedures. 
As the d'Hondt method does neither apply in the federal elections in Germany nor in 
New Zealand, this paper confines itself to describe only the probably most common of 
these three methods. 
This is the simple procedure of the "highest numbers".
71 The votes a political party 
obtained are divided by the numbers 1,2,3 ... . The seats in Parliament are then 
distributed according to the highest numbers obtained by that calculation.
72 This 
means that if it is imagined that a Parliament has 120 seats as in New Zealand, then 
66 For details about the d 'Hondt formula see d 'Hondt <http ://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/dhondt.htmb 
(last accessed 29 June 2003). 
67 BYerfGE 79, 169ff, above, 2. 
68 BYerfGE 79, 169ff, above, 2. 
69 d 'Hondt, above. 
70 d 'Hondt, above. 
7 1 d 'Hondt, above. 
72 d 'Hondt, above. 
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the 120 highest numbers obtained from that calculation would lead to a seat m 
Parliament. 
Merits and demerits 
A considerable advantage of this method is that it consists of an easy algorithm.
73 
Also, it does not present the difficulties related to the Hare/Niemeyer fommla 
described above. 
But this method also presents its difficulties: it is not absolutely proportional as it 
tends to privilege larger political parties. 74 The reason for this is that this formula 
privileges the party that obtains the last seat - and it is not unlikely that this is a larger 
party. 75 The Liberal Democrat Party FDP for example only obtained 3.4 per cent of 
the seats having a share of 5.2 per cent of the votes in Bavaria (Bayem) in 1990.76 
Another disadvantage is that it can happen that two parties obtain exactly the same 
number using this method where this number would be decisive for the distribution of 
the last seat. 77 Therefore the question of which party obtains the seat would have to be 
decided by drawing lots or comparable methods that cannot be considered as 
satisfactory. 
3 Sainte Lague 
The Sainte Lague mathematical formula applies in New Zealand. This formula is 
also known as the Sainte Lague I Schepers procedure, the Webster's method or the 
method of odd numbers.78 This formula was developed by the American politician 
Daniel Webster (1782-1852), the French mathematician Jean-Andre' Sainte Lague 
(1882-1950) and the German employee of the Bundestag Hans Schepers (*1928).
79 
According to this formula and pursuant to section 191 (5) of the Electoral Act 1993, 
the sum of the votes for a political party is divided by odd numbers beginning with 1, 
73 Deutscher Bundestag <http ://www.bundestag.de/gremien/ 1431 /azur/azur _ 3.html> (last accessed 29 
June 2003). 
74 Deutscher Bundestag, above. 
75 Formeln zur Stimmenverwertung in Verhaltniswahlsystemen 
<http ://www.fortunecity.de/parkalleen/lindenallee/ 102/leseprob.htm> (last accessed 8 May 2003) . 
76 d 'Hondt <http ://www.wahlrecht.de/verfalu·en/dhondt.html> (last accessed 29 June 2003). 
77 Deutscher Bundestag, above. 
78 Sainte Lague <http://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/stlague.html> (last accessed 8 May 2003). 
79 Sainte Lague, above. 
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3, 5, 7, 9 11, 13 ... The 120 highest results determine both the number of seats in 
Parliament for each paiiy and the order in which they are allocated, section 191 (7) of 
the Electoral Act 1993. Given the case that independent candidates win seats these 
would, pursuant to section 191 (7) of the Electoral Act 1993, be subtracted from the 
total number of seats to be distributed among the parties. 80 
Merits and demerits 
The formula Sainte Lague has the advantage that it also consists of a simple 
algorithm81 and it does not privilege any political parties dependent on their size. The 
results obtained by this formula are always proportional.
82 The reason for this is that 
Sainte Lague uses only odd numbers instead of all natural numbers as the d'Hondt 
formula. The requirements for achieving seats decreases therefore and this leads to 
equivalent chances for political parties independently from their sizes. 83 
This formula also has the unsatisfactory characteristic of the possibility of obtaining 
identical numbers after a calculation that is decisive for the distribution of the last 
seat. 84 This possibility is shown in the following example: A certain committee has 5 
seats. 200 electors took part in the election, from which party A obtained 100 votes, 
party B 60 and party C 40. The numbers obtained dividing these results by the number 
1 are A: 100, B: 60 and C: 40. Dividing by the number 3 results in A: 33.333, B: 20 
and C: 13.333 and by the number 5 results in A: 20, B: 12 and C: 8. Thus, the four 
highest numbers are 100 (A), 60 (B), 40 (C) and 33 .333 (A). The parties A and B both 
obtained the fifth highest number 20. This number is decisive for the distribution of 
the last seat. 
Section 191 (9) of the Electoral Act 1993 states that when such an unlikely 
circumstance happens, it has to be detennined by lot by the Chief Electoral Officer 
which of those numbers is going to be selected. 
80 Sainte Lague explained <http: //www.elections.org.nz/e lections/pandr/sainte _Jague.htrnl> (last 
accessed 21 May 2003). 
8 1 Deutscher Bundestag <http://www.bundestag.de/gremien/1431 /azur/azur _3.htrnl> (last accessed 29 
June 2003). 
82 Sainte Lague <http ://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/st1ague.htm1> (last accessed 8 May 2003). 
8' , Deutscher Bundestag, above. 
84 Deutscher Bundestag, above. 
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Despite this, the Sainte Lague formula is exposed to unsatisfactory results in a lesser 
extent than other formulas. Particularly, the Sainte Lague formula does neither present 
all the difficulties of the Hare/Niemeyer method demonstrated above nor does it 
discriminate smaller parties as the d 'Hondt formula. 
4 General problems that can occur with all formulas 
Independent of which formula is utilised, some problems belonging to the group of 
the negative weight of votes can always occur. The most important ones are the 
following: 
(a) Overhanging seats 
A problem that regularly occurs in Germany and could also occur in New Zealand is 
that the loss of party votes can lead to overhanging seats, so that a party obtains more 
seats than it is entitled to because of the party votes it obtained. 85 
(b) Seats of compensation for overhanging seats 
Electoral systems can provide prov1s10ns for seats of compensation. Seats of 
compensation are additional seats other political parties obtain in compensation for 
overhanging seats. It is arguable that these seats of compensation represent a risk 
concerning the negative weight of votes as they basically penalise parties that won 
more seats by the electorate than by the party vote and therefore obtained overhanging 
seats. 86 
5 Conclusion 
Numerous mathematicians have been working on this question for centuries and it 
has been mathematically demonstrated in 1978 that it is impossible to develop an 
85 Oberhangmandat und negatives Stinungewicht 
<http//www.wahlrecht.de/ueberhang/ueberhangmandat.html> (last accessed 28 August 2003). For an 
explanation of the phenomenon of overhanging seats see II D 1. 
86 Ausgleichsmandate <http: //www.wahlrecht.de/lexikon/ausgleichsmandate.html> (last accessed 25 
August 2003). 
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errorless method to calculate the number of seats belonging to a certain party.
87 Thus, 
this paper cannot propose a better solution than the one developed by Sainte Lague 
and Schepers. The Sainte Lague formula is the preferred method as it presents the 
lowest possibility of absurd results. Germany should follow the example given by 
New Zealand and introduce the Sainte Lague method. Numerous problems could be 
avoided with this formula. Some German politicians and mathematicians have 
recognised this by now and the German Chief Electoral Officer concluded after his 
survey in 1999 that the Sainte Lague formula is preferable. 88 In consequence a 
committee of the Bundestag is dealing with the question whether Sainte Lague should 
be introduced in Germany. 
D Principal Disadvantages of our Voting System 
1 Overhanging seats 
It could be said that the MMP voting system is a fully proportional voting system 
because the party vote determines the overall total of seats each party receives. 89 But 
there is a problem related to this: the overhanging seats. These occur when a party is 
entitled to less seats according to the party vote than it is by the electorate vote. The 
seats won in the electoral districts remain with that party pursuant to §§ 6 V, 7 III 2 
BWahlG and section 192 (5) of the Electoral Act 1993. They enlarge the number of 
seats in Parliament and change its proportional composition. 
(a) Germany 
Germany, being a federal state, has the provisions of§§ 7 III, 6 II BWahlG ruling 
the sub-distribution of seats belonging to a certain political party among the 
Bundeslander. This is the reason why in theory, there are two possible categories of 
overhanging seats. Due to their two-staged distribution of seats, a difference has to be 
made between the nationwide and the statewide overhanging seats. Nationwide 
overhanging seats could only occur when a certain political party wins more seats by 
87 Fom1eln zur Stimmenverwertung in Yerhaltniswahlsystemen 
<http://www.fortunecity.de/parkalleen/ lindenallee/ I 02/leseprob.htm> (last accessed 8 May 2003). 
88 Sainte Lague <http ://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/s tlague .html> (last accessed 8 May 2003). 
89 Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation (Ashgate, 
Christchurch, 1998) 2. 
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the electorate vote than by party vote in the whole country. These nationwide 
overhanging seats did not occur in any federal election yet and cannot be considered 
as probable. 90 Statewide overhanging seats arise in the Bundesfander and are a 
consequence of the German system of splitting up the list of one party into the 
different lists of the Lander.91 These statewide overhanging seats occur frequently. 
In order to show how important statewide overhanging seats became in Germany, 
their number in the federal elections is shown below: 
Year Land Amount of overhanging seats Party 
Bremen 1 SPD 
1949 
Baden 1 CDU 
1953 
Schleswig-Holstein 2 CDU 
Hamburg 1 DP 
1957 Schleswig-Holstein 3 CDU 
1961 
Schleswig-Holstein 4 CDU 
Saarland 1 CDU 
1980 Schleswig-Holstein 1 SPD 
Hamburg 1 SPD 
1983 
Bremen 1 SPD 
1987 Baden-Wtirttemberg 1 CDU 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2 CDU 
1990 Sachsen-Anhalt 3 CDU 
Thtiringen 1 CDU 
Baden-Wtirttemberg 2 CDU 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommem 2 CDU 
Sachsen-Anhalt 2 CDU 
1994 Thiiringen 3 CDU 
Sachsen 3 CDU 
Bremen 1 SPD 
Brandenburg 
,., SPD .) 
1998 Hamburg 1 SPD 
90 Interne und externe Dberhangmandate <http ://www.wahlrecht.de/ueberhang/internextern.htrn> 
(last accessed 25 August 2003). 
9 1 Interne und externe Dberhangmandate, above. 
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Mecklenburg-Vorpommem 2 SPD 
Brandenburg 3 SPD 
Sachsen-Anhalt 4 SPD 
Thuringen 3 SPD 
Hamburg 1 SPD 
Sachsen-Anhalt 2 SPD 
2002 
Th tiring en 1 SPD 
Sachsen 1 CDU 
Source: Geschichte der Uberhangmandate 
<http: //www.wahlrecht.de/ueberhang/ueberhist. html> 
(last accessed 26 August 2003). 
As can be observed, the political parties that benefited from overhanging seats are 
the Christian Democrats (CDU) with a total of 31 overhanging seats in the period 
from 1949 to 2002, the Social Democrats (SPD) with a total of 25 and the German 
Party (DP) with one overhanging seat in the same period of time. Generally speaking, 
the number of overhanging seats is increasing as can be seen in the following graphic: 
Total amount oJ 
Year overhanging seats 
1949 2 
1953 3 
1957 3 
1961 5 
1980 1 
1983 2 
1987 1 
1990 6 
1994 16 
1998 13 
2002 5 
--
For several decades, overhanging seats were quite irrelevant as the composition of 
Parliament was not changed decisively. But the sixteen overhanging seats that 
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occurred in 1994 led to the fact that the then Christian - Liberal coalition in the 
Bundestag could stabilize its narrow majority with them. Without the overhanging 
seats and the passover of one Member of Parliament from the Green party to the 
Christian Democrats, the coalition had just exactly the number of seats for an absolute 
majority. If then only one member of the coalition had missed the election, the re-
election of the former German chancellor Helmut Kohl would have been impossible. 92 
Overhanging seats were then considered as the "harassers of the proportionality" in 
Parliament.93 This was the reason why the German public became aware of the 
problem related to overhanging seats and a debate started about their constitutionality. 
An analysis made after the federal elections in 1994 concluded that there were 
several reasons for the emergence of the sixteen overhanging seats. The direct reasons 
logically are that parties won numerous electoral districts and only sparse party votes. 
This can happen by the splitting of votes, where the electors give different parties 
support through their party and electorate vote. But there are other reasons that 
influence in an indirect way. One of these is the low participation in the elections 
particularly in the five new Bundesliinder.94 Low participation is conducive to 
overhanging seats as it reduces the amount of party votes for the lists of the affected 
Land. It was also referred to the erroneous allocation of electoral districts among the 
Bundesliinder, as these were often unequal. 95 If the 328 electoral districts had been 
similar in their dimensions there would have been an equal distribution of electoral 
districts among the Bundesliinder and the possibility of obtaining overhanging seats 
would be lower. 96 
German political parties and a reform comm1ss1on of the Bundestag have since 
worked on a better allocation of electoral districts and set up a new allocation that was 
introduced for the federal elections in 2002. Since then, pursuant to § 1 BWahlG 
Germany has only 299 electoral districts instead of 328 and 598 Members of 
Parliament instead of 656 (without the overhanging seats). 
92 Berliner Morgenpost 11 April 1997 
<http://www.wahlrecht.de/ueberhang/chronic/berlinermorgenpost-story05. html> ( last accessed 27 
August 2003). 
93 Deutscher Bundestag <http://www.bundestag.de/info/wahlen/wahlverfahren/wahlen4.html> (last 
accessed 27 August 2003). 
94 Deutscher Bundestag, above. 
95 Der aktuelle BegriffUberhangmandate 
<http://www.bundestag.de/aktuell/begriff/2003/04_2003.pdf> (last accessed 27 August 2003). 
96 Deutscher Bundestag, above. 
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(b) New Zealand 
New Zealand has not yet experienced the phenomenon of overhanging seats. This 
can be partially explained by its different electoral organisation. Statewide 
overhanging seats cannot occur in New Zealand as it is not a federal state and 
therefore has not divided its party lists as Germany has. The possibility of the 
occurrence of nationwide overhanging seats is improbable, but cannot be eliminated. 
Neve1iheless, the number of overhanging seats that occurred in Germany would not 
be reached in New Zealand. But the extent of the changes to the proportional 
composition of Parliament could become as problematic as it has in Germany ... 
( c) Possibilities of handling overhanging seats 
When the possibility of overhanging seats 1s given, it should be dealt with the 
different possibilities of handling them. 
One possibility consists of subtracting the number of overhanging seats that political 
parties obtained from the number of seats that correspond to other parties. The aim of 
this method is to keep the total number of seats in Parliament constant. This method is 
used, among others, in the Scottish Parliament. 97 It has the advantage that the numbers 
of seats in Parliament remain the same notwithstanding the existence of overhanging 
seats; but it intensifies the problem of an unproportional Parliament. This method 
would logically be the most convenient for parties that obtained overhanging seats. 
Another possibility of handling overhanging seats is admitting them in addition to 
the regular number of seats in Parliament. Therefore Parliament would be enlarged. 
This model applies both in Germany and in New Zealand pursuant to §§ 6 V, 7 III 2 
BWahlG and section 192 (5) of the Electoral Act 1993. Its problem is an 
unproportional Parliament. 
Furthermore, it might be reasonable to create seats of compensation for those parties 
that did not obtain overhanging seats. An example for this solution is provided by the 
97 Schottisches Parlament <http://www.wahlrecht.de/ausland/schottland.htm> (last accessed 29 August 
2003). 
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Land Nordrhein-Westfalen.98 The advantage of this possibility is the proportionality 
of (the enlarged) Parliament notwithstanding the overhanging seats. 
Finally, the overhanging seats could also just not be allocated, meaning that their 
existence would not be pern1itted. This method was temporarily used in the Land 
Bavaria,99 but it is the most problematic way of handling this phenomenon. It would 
mean that some directly elected candidates would not be able to enter Parliament. 
This would be a very serious violation of the principle of democracy. In addition, 
there would also not be a satisfactory method of deciding which directly elected 
candidates could access Parliament and which not. This method would be the most 
inconvenient solution for those parties that obtained overhanging seats. 
A combination of the methods described above is also possible. 
Before considering these possibilities in depth, the two judgements of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court about the constitutionality of overhanging seats will be 
discussed. 
(d) Judgements of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
The German Federal Constitutional Court delivered two judgements concerning the 
question about the constitutionality of overhanging seats. The art. 38 of the German 
Constitution is of special importance concerning these judgements. Its wording is the 
following: 
"Article 38 (Elections) 
(1) The members of the Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal, 
and secrete elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound 
by orders and instructions, and shall be subject only to their conscience. 
(2) Anyone who has attained the age of eighteen years shall be entitled to vote; 
anyone who has attained full legal age shall be eligible for election. 
(3) Details shall be regulated by a federal law." 
98 Umgang rnit Oberhangmandaten <http: //www.wahlrecht.de/ueberhang/umgang.htrn1> (last accessed 
26 August 2003). 
99 Umgang mit Uberhangmandaten, above. 
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The Court has also considered ways to deal with the occurrence of overhanging 
seats. 
(i) Judgement of 1988 
The first complaint was lodged against the ruling of§ 6 V BWahlG in 1988. 100 This 
provision states that overhanging seats are pennitted. Seats of compensation for other 
parties are not provided. The appellant argued that this provision represents a 
violation of the principle of the equality of votes guaranteed by art. 38 I 1 of the 
Gennan Constitution. According to the judiciary of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court this principle requires not only the equality in counting votes (one person - one 
vote), but also that the outcome for each vote is equal. 101 The appellant argued that 
this principle requires mathematical correctness that would only be reached by 
conferring as many seats of compensation as overhanging seats occurred. 102 
The Court observed that the divergence from the principle of the same outcome for 
each vote caused by the occurrence of overhanging seats is necessarily related to the 
electoral system. 
Unequal sized electoral districts represent a problem for vote equality. However, the 
exact same outcome for each vote is not achievable independently from the methods 
used. 103 The average number of votes each party needed to obtain one seat in 
Parliament in 1987 (the occurred overhanging seat was not considered) was 
mentioned. These were: 
74,435 for the Green Party, 
74,802 for the Free Democrat Party 
75,407 for the Social Democrat Party 
75,409 for the Christian Democrat Union and 
75,833 for the Christian Social Union.
104 
100 BVerfGE 79, 169ff available at <http: //www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/dfr/bv079169.htm1> (last accessed 
30 September 2003). 
10 1 BVerfGE 79, 169ff, above. 
102 BVerfGE 79, 169ff, above. 
103 BVerfGE 79, 169ff available at <http: //www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/dfr/bv079169.html> (last accessed 
30 September 2003). 
104 BVerfGE 79, 169ff, above. 
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If the one overhanging seat that occurred in 1987 is considered, the Christian 
Democrat Union had to have 74,976 votes for each seat. This number is still higher 
than the number required by the Green and the Free Democrats. Referring to their 
argument that an absolute mathematical correctness is not achievable with any 
method, it was concluded that a seat of compensation was not necessary. Thus, it was 
observed unanimously that the provision of§ 6 V BWahJG is constitutional. 105 
(ii) Judgement of 1995 
Things had changed by the time the Constitutional Court was confronted with 
another constitutional complaint against the provision of§ 6 V BWahlG 106 in 1995. 
The federal elections in 1994 brought sixteen overhanging seats. 107 
The petitioner was the (Social Democrat) government of the Land Niedersachsen 
under the later German federal chancellor Gerhard Schroder. The Land submitted that 
the occurrence of overhanging seats is not in accordance with the principle of equality 
of votes required by art. 38 I 1 of the German Constitution as Jong as seats of 
compensation are not provided. 108 It argued that the provision in question is a 
violation of the principle of democracy. This could be demonstrated with the federal 
elections in 1994, when the occurred overhanging seats had the consequence of an 
unequal outcome for each vote. At a federal level, the Christian Democrat Union 
obtained 830,000 less votes than normally necessary for the number of seats that 
belonged to that party. The same occurred with the Social Democrats, who obtained 
277,000 less votes. 109 It was also submitted that there were no justifying aspects for 
this inequality. The aim of MMP, which is a strong personal tie to a certain electoral 
district of half of the Members of the Bundestag, could also be reached by conferring 
seats of compensation to other parties or by other measures of compensation.
11 0 These 
other possible measures of compensation could consist in a subtraction of list seats of 
the party affected by overhanging seats in the other Lander. The fact that some 
105 BYerfGE 79, 169ff, above. 
106 And § 7 III BWahlG, which is related to the special German method of the sub-distribution of seats 
among the Lander. 
107 See above under II D I (a). 
108 BYerfGE 95, 335ff available at <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/ law/dfr/bv095335 .htm1> (last accessed 
30 September 2003) I. 
109 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 5. 
11 0 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 5. 
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Bundeslander would thus not be properly represented in Parliament was not 
considered as problematic as the Bundestag is a unitarian government body. The 
lower representation of some Lander in Parliament would also primarily be caused by 
overhanging seats and not by the measures of compensation. Referring to the second 
possibility, the seats of compensation, it was argued that the overhanging seats are 
what creates an unequal representation of the Bundeslander in the Bundestag, not the 
proposed seats of compensation. 111 
The Constitutional Court asked some important institutions such as the federal 
government and the different political parties in the Bundestag for their opinion on the 
issue. 
The federal government, represented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, argued 
with the wording of art. 38 III of the German Constitution. This provision states that 
the concrete electoral system should be input and ruled by the legislature. There is no 
provision in the constitution that rules on the German electoral system. The existing 
electoral system would not be a "pure" proportional one. If the overhanging seats were 
compensated by other seats or by the proposed subtracting method, this would not be 
in accordance with the will of the legislature. 112 Also, political parties should be given 
an incentive to make an effort to work with candidates who have a strong tie to a 
certain area and who do good work in the constituencies. Such an incentive would be 
gone by the time a compensation for overhanging seats was provided. 113 In addition, 
the German method of a sub-distribution of seats among the Lander guarantees an 
equal representation of these in Parliament. Methods of compensation would have had 
the consequence of 891 members in the Bundestag in 1994.
114 This could be a serious 
problem in relation to the efficiency of the Bundestag. An alternative solution to the 
problem was alleged to be a partial compensation. But the problem of an unequal 
representation of the Lander in the Bundestag would not be resolved by this possible 
method.11 5 It would consist of assigning seats of compensation to the Lander that did 
not obtain any overhanging seats. The number of overhanging seats obtained would 
111 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 5. 
11 2 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 6. 
11 3 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 6. 
11 4 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 6. 
11 5 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 7. 
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not be considered, the Lander with only one would be treated in the same way as 
those with several. 116 
The German Federal Electoral Officer was also consulted. In his opm1on, the 
occurrence of overhanging seats could not be prevented with a prohibition of splitting 
votes. This was confirmed by the Electoral Officers of the Lander Baden-
Wiirttemberg, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Schleswig-Holstein. These Lander had 
experienced overhanging seats despite the fact that the electors could not split their 
votes. 117 
The Court considered that the provision in question is constitutional. This decision 
was taken by four of the eight Judges of the Federal Constitutional Court. The reasons 
given by the four Judges supporting this decision of the Court were the following: 
The Constitution in its art. 38 III transferred the competence of ruling the electoral 
system to the legislature. The legislature therefore has the competence of introducing 
proportional representation or a majority voting system; these methods can also be 
combined. It is not a duty of the Constitutional Court to examine whether the decision 
of the legislature is preferable or not. The principle of the equality of votes guaranteed 
by art. 38 I 1 of the Constitution requires an ex ante view and this has a different 
meaning for the two main electoral systems. 
It is the purpose of the majority voting system that only the votes for the successful 
candidate lead to a seat in Parliament, whereas the votes for unsuccessful candidates 
do not have any influence. The principle of the equality of votes under this voting 
system requires that the electoral districts are similar in their extensions, so that it can 
be assured that the weight of the votes is comparable.
11 8 However, when proportional 
representation applies, this principle basically requires that each elector has the same 
. . f p 1· 119 influence on the compos1t10n o ar iament. 
11 6 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 7. 
11 7 BYerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 8. 
11 8 BYerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 12. 
11 9 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, l 2. 
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The occurrence of overhanging seats does change the proportional representation in 
Parliament and therefore has an influence on the outcome for each vote in an 
election.
120 
But this is a necessary consequence of the electoral system MMP and is 
therefore in accordance with the principle of the equality of votes as long as the 
electoral districts have comparable sizes.121 Nevertheless, when considering this 
question, it has to be seen that the electoral districts have to be distributed among the 
Bundeslcinder. Additionally, it does not make sense and is against the idea of 
Members of Parliament having a strong tie to their electoral districts to frequently 
adjust these to any new circumstances. 122 Such a personal relationship of a candidate 
to a certain electoral district requires a certain continuity of the existence of this 
constituency. It would not be in accordance with the principle of a democratic 
representation if the electoral districts would continuously be subject to reform. The 
historical borders should also be kept in mind. 123 
The sizes of the current electoral districts are significantly unequal and variations of 
33.3 per cent or more can no longer be tolerated. Nevertheless, there is no reason for 
declaring the distribution of electoral districts as unconstitutional as the work on their 
. . h 1 d d 124 reorganisation as a rea y starte . 
The Judges considered that even if the choice of the applicable electoral system falls 
within the competence of the legislature, a different weight of each vote in the 
outcome of an election is not permitted without limitations. The idea of having a 
Parliament that is half directly elected and half elected by the party vote cannot be 
fulfilled when the numbers of overhanging seats are constantly increasing. 
Nevertheless, the decision whether or not the electoral system should be changed 
primarily falls within the competence of the legislature according to art. 38 III of the 
German Constitution. 125 The legislature could be orientated by the idea of the 
threshold of five per cent of all valid votes, which could be helpful concerning the 
question of a tolerable limit for overhanging seats. Then, unconstitutionality would be 
given when the number of overhanging seats leads to a change of or over five per cent 
120 BYerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 15. 
12 1 BYerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 15. 
122 BYerfGE 95 , 335ff, above,19. 
123 BYerfGE 95 , 335ff, above,19. 
124 BYerfGE 95 , 335ff, above,19. 
125 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 20. 
39 
of the proportional representation in Parliament. 126 Considering these thoughts and 
from a constitutional point of view, the legislature is not required to introduce any 
changes as the number of overhanging seats occurred did not reach five per cent of all 
seats in Parliament. 127 
Additionally, the possibility of overhanging seats occurring does not mean that the 
electors can give their votes a double weight in advance. 128 The individual elector 
does not have any influence on the general voting behaviour. 129 
For these reasons, it was concluded that the provision of § 6 V BWahlG 1s 
constitutional. 
The four Judges who voted against these findings considered that the provision of§ 
6 V BWahlG is not in accordance with art. 38 I 1 of the German Constitution when it 
leads to a number of overhanging seats that results in an unproportional composition 
of Parliament. This would occur whenever the variations caused by the overhanging 
seats are superior to the necessary irregularities due to the mathematical formula 
used. 130 
These four Judges gave the following reasons: an election in a democratic state is 
the event where the population exercises the state authority and legitimises the 
resulting executive body. Therefore it is essential for the democratic state to guarantee 
the equal treatment of all citizens in the elections. Thus, art. 38 I 1 of the German 
Constitution guarantees a strict equality of all electors. 
131 Nevertheless, the question 
whether an election presents an unequal handling of votes cannot be answered 
independently from the electoral system used. The majority voting system does 
naturally grant success only to the votes for the most popular candidate in order to 
guarantee a functioning Parliament. A strict equality of chances here is guaranteed by 
an equal distribution of electoral districts. 
132 Compared with this, the elections in 
proportional representation are not done by counting the votes for each candidate. 
Subsequently, a mathematical formula is used to detem1ine the proportions in 
126 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 20. 
127 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 20. 
128 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above,} 7. 
129 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above,18. 
130 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 21. 
131 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 21. 
132 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 22. 
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Parliament. Then, the principle of the strict equality of votes requires that each elector 
has the same influence on the outcome of the elections. Thus, it is not only required 
that each elector has the same chance of influencing the outcome, but each vote needs 
to have the same outcome in the result. 133 Nevertheless, this requirement is different 
from an ex post point of view due to the problems necessarily related to the 
mathematical formulas. 134 
Overhanging seats do have their cause in an "overhang" of directly elected 
candidates in the electoral districts, but they are not "direct seats". 135 Overhanging 
seats only represent a number of seats that are given to a certain party beyond the 
proportion. As the number of electoral districts and therefore directly elected 
candidates was established at and is always 328, 136 list candidates fulfill the 
overhanging seats. 137 The distribution of these seats, which are not part of the regular 
number of seats, is not ruled by the majority voting system and is therefore not 
governed by the requirements of the principle of the equality of votes for this system. 
The majority of votes can only justify the existence of a seat "offered" to the electors 
before the election took place. 138 On the other hand, overhanging seats, being caused 
by the direct votes, are not governed by the rules for the proportional system either. 139 
Furthermore, if the equality of votes in the outcome is applied only as long as 
directly elected candidates can be subtracted from the list seats belonging to a certain 
party, it overlooks that the majority voting system merges with the proportional 
system at that point. The principle of the equality of votes does not permit to 
guarantee the same outcome for votes only until the regularly 656 seats in Parliament 
are distributed. 140 The MMP electoral system creates the possibility of the occurrence 
of overhanging seats. But this possibility, from an ex ante point of view, does not 
guarantee an equal possibility for all electors to influence the outcome of the election. 
Each vote only has, ex ante, the same possibility of influencing something that from 
the beginning is an unequal regulation. The elector only has the same chance as 
133 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 23. 
134 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 23 . 
135 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 29. 
136 There were 328 electoral districts before the electoral district reform in 2002. Nowadays Germany 
presents only 299 electoral districts. 
137 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 29. 
138 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 29. 
139 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 29. 
140 BYerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 32. 
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everyone else to belong to the group of electors whose votes will count double in the 
result. Such a provision does not guarantee an equal treatment of all electors and is 
therefore not in accordance with art. 38 I 1 of the Gemrnn Constitution. 141 
When overhanging seats occur, the total number of seats in Parliament should still 
be distributed according to the proportions in the election. There are diverse methods 
of achieving this result. The easiest is not to consider the directly elected candidates 
with the fewest amount of votes. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that this solution 
would have the consequence of not considering one of the aims ofMMP. Each elector 
should have the possibility of influencing not only the proportional, but also the 
personal composition of Parliament. This renouncement is not necessary as there are 
other solutions. 142 
One of these could consist of granting seats of compensation. Referring to the 
arguments of the opposing four Judges concerning the then absolutely irrational high 
number of seats in Parliament, it has to be observed that only fifteen additional seats 
would have been needed in 1994 to achieve a certain balance for the occurrence of 
overhanging seats. 143 Nevertheless, this solution finds its limits when Parliament is 
enlarged to an extent where the functioning of Parliament could not be guaranteed 
anymore. 144 
A possible model that is, in comparison, milder is the subtraction of overhanging 
seats of one party in one Bundesland from the seats which belong to the same party in 
another Bundesland. This model can prevent the Bundestag having more than the 
regular number of seats. The disadvantage of this possible solution is that the different 
party lists of the Lander would not be represented equally in Parliament. But this 
disadvantage does currently already exist. Those party lists of the Lander, which 
could achieve overhanging seats, are better represented in Parliament than they would 
be according to the proportions after the elections.
145 The unequal representation of 
the Lander in the Bundestag, which exists currently to a certain extent due to the 
overhanging seats, is still better than an unequal treatment of votes related to 
141 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 26. 
142 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 25. 
143 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 42 . 
144 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 43 . 
145 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 41. 
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overhanging seats. In addition, there is no regulation or principle in the German 
Constitution requiring the Bundeslander to be represented equally in Parliament. 146 
Also, the inequality of votes related to the occurrence of overhanging seats is 
conducive to a diminution of the principle of equal opportunities for political parties. 
This is made very clear when the amount of votes a party required for a seat after the 
federal elections in 1994 is observed. The Christian Democrat Union needed 69,353 
votes for each seat in Parliament if the overhanging seats are not considered, but only 
65,942 votes if these are taken into consideration. The Social Democrats needed 
69,114 votes, but only 68,017 if the overhanging seats are considered. The Free 
Democrats had to have 69,328 votes, the Christian Social Union 68,544 votes, the 
Green Party 69,884 and the Socialists 68,873 votes. Thus, the Christian Democrats 
needed 3,942 less votes than the Green Party for one seat, while the biggest necessary 
difference due to the problems related to the mathematical formulas was only 1,340 
votes between the Christian Social Union and the Green Party. 147 Overhanging seats 
are only tolerable as long as the difference in the outcome of votes is necessarily 
related to proportional representation. 148 
Referring to the proposal of the other four Judges concerning the threshold of five 
per cent of all valid votes, it was considered that this threshold aims to guarantee a 
functioning Parliament. This question is a completely different issue than the question 
of a tolerable difference in the outcome for each vote; the threshold is therefore 
unsuitable here. 149 
The provision in question aims to provide an incentive for political parties to make 
an effort concerning the political work in the electoral districts in order to gain 
overhanging seats. This is absolutely contrary to the principle of a strict equality of 
votes. 150 In addition, the provision of§ 6 V BWahlG is not suitable to do so. There is 
no incentive for political parties, as their chances of gaining an overhanging seat do 
not increase with good work in the electoral districts. The more successful a party is 
146 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 42 . 
147 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 34. 
148 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 36. 
149 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 36. 
150 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 36. 
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m general, the lower is its chance to gam an overhanging seat. 151 Therefore, only 
parties with a lower success and fewer party votes benefit from the provision in 
question. 152 
( e) Convincing methods for solution 
When looking at the possible solutions for overhanging seats, the question whether 
these need to be found should be answered first. The four supporting Judges 
expressed that overhanging seats are necessarily related to MMP and that electors 
cannot give their votes a double weight in advance. As the opposing Judges observed, 
this only means that the electors have the same possibility of influencing something 
that, from the beginning, is an unequal regulation. 
Consenting with the four opposing Judges, it has to be said that the threshold of five 
per cent exists to ensure a functioning Parliament and that the present question is a 
different issue. Nevertheless, the idea that a variation of the proportional composition 
of Parliament of fewer than five per cent is tolerable could be supported. Then, it 
could be argued that, as the number of overhanging seats did not reach this percentage 
neither in Germany nor in New Zealand (where overhanging seats have not yet 
occurred), the variation of the proportional representation is still insignificant. 
However, there have been instances where a variation of less than five per cent has 
had a significant political impact. One of these was the situation given in 1994, where 
the overhanging seats stabilized the German government under the former chancellor 
Helmut Kohl. This means that the premise of the supporting Judges that a variation of 
the proportional composition of Parliament fewer than five per cent is tolerable could 
be questioned. Sixteen or almost 2.5 per cent additional seats in a Parliament with a 
regular number of (then) 656 seats cannot be considered as a marginal variation. 
In conclusion, overhanging seats are problematic. But are they really necessarily 
related to MMP? They occur, as it is well known, by the fact that a party obtains more 
seats by the electorate than by the party vote. Even if there are several reasons for this 
phenomenon, one of the most obvious is the possibility of splitting votes. This 
possibility is used by an increasing number of electors. One could expect the 
151 BVerfGE 95 , 335ff, above, 36. 
152 BVerfGE 95, 335ff, above, 37. 
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avoidance of a significant number of overhanging seats by the prohibition of vote 
splitting. Even if the problem of their occurrence cannot be completely resolved by 
such a prohibition, their practical importance could undoubtedly be reduced. 
Nevertheless, when thinking about such a solution, the problems related to it have to 
be faced. Such a prohibition would signify a violation of the principle of the equality 
of votes. Those electors who vote for a smaller party like the Green or Free 
Democrats in Germany or the Green or United Future in New Zealand would not be 
able to influence the personal composition of Parliament. The reason for this 
obviously is that the direct candidates of these small parties are very unlikely to be 
elected by the majority of votes in an electoral district. Such a prohibition would mean 
at the very end that one of the advantages of MMP, the possibility of the electors to 
choose their favourite candidate besides having a Parliament that reflects the 
diversities in a society, would be annulled. 
In Germany, at regular intervals, measures should be taken to reduce the possible 
number of overhanging seats by dividing the whole territory into equal electoral 
districts among the Bundeslander. Nevertheless, the possibility of the occurrence of 
overhanging seats cannot be avoided. 
Some specific proposals for solution to the overhanging seats have been raised by 
the Court and these solutions are discussed here. The four opposing Judges expressed 
the opinion that the easiest way of handling the problem consists of simply not 
admitting those directly elected candidates into Parliament, who obtained the lowest 
result in the elections. This suggestion absolutely disregards the principle of 
democracy and is therefore not acceptable. All directly elected candidates must obtain 
a seat in Parliament. This should be considered as immanent to the electoral system 
MMP. 
The idea of subtracting the number of overhanging seats from the list seats that 
belong to the same party in the other Bundeslander can only be applied in a country 
with a provision stating the sub-distribution of seats among different regions. Such a 
provision does not exist in New Zealand, but in Germany with § 7 BWahlG. 
Therefore this idea does not represent a general solution for the problem. Concerning 
its possible application in Germany, it has to be seen that it would be conducive to an 
unequal representation of the Lcinder in the Bundestag. Even if an equal 
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representation is not a written principle in the German Constitution, it is strongly 
desirable that the different regions are equally represented in the national Parliament. 
If it is argued that such an inequality is already produced by the occurrence of 
overhanging seats and therefore exists anyway, it has to be observed that subtracting 
the number of these overhanging seats from the party lists of the same party in the 
other Lander would strongly intensify this problem. 
The model of the seats of compensation for other parties has the disadvantage that 
the then extremely large Parliaments could have a problem concerning their 
efficiency. As a functioning Parliament is essential for a good working democratic 
state, this solution cannot be considered as satisfactory. 
Nevertheless, a minimum number of seats of compensation for other parties could be 
provided. This way, the directly elected candidates, who have the advantage of a 
strong tie to their electoral districts, would be able to influence the parliamentary 
work without privileging their political party to some extent. This model presents the 
disadvantage that the composition of Parliament would still not be proportional. 
In conclusion, the possibility of the occurrence of overhanging seats cannot be 
avoided and the best proposal made by the Judges of the Constitutional Court to 
change the current situation and mitigate the problem is to confer a minimum of seats 
of compensation to the parties that did not obtain overhanging seats. Through this, a 
certain balance for overhanging seats could be created. Nevertheless, this solution 
presents the problem of a further enlargement of Parliament. Especially in New 
Zealand, there is a public resistance to such an enlargement. The Royal Commission 
on the Electoral System ascertained that the cost for each additional Member of 
Parliament amounts $ 142,000 per year. This sum does not include additional costs as 
the accommodation within Parliament Buildings. 
153 In order to avoid the enlargement 
of Parliament and the problems related to it, a New Zealand citizen 
154 made the 
proposal that these seats of compensation could be conferred in a notional form. The 
official who controls the work of the members of the particular parties would hold 
their votes. In New Zealand, the whips of the political parties would be in charge of 
voting for the notional Members of Parliament. This proposal has the advantages that 
153 Royal Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" (1986-87] IX AJHR 
H.3 126. 
154 Oral proposal by Rana Waitai. 
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it gives less reason for public resistance and avoids the additional costs related to any 
additional seats in Parliament. On the other hand, it is also quite problematic. It 
presents no satisfactory solutions for certain circumstances such as political parties 
splitting up. Besides this, the problem of an unproportional composition of Parliament 
cannot be resolved with just some seats of compensation. Thus, there would be no 
significant advantages of introducing some seats of compensation. But the conferment 
of more seats of compensation in order to re-establish proportionality in Parliament 
would lead to irrational high numbers of seats. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude 
that overhanging seats should be tolerated without any measures of compensation. 
The idea of subtracting the number of overhanging seats from the number of seats 
that belong to other political parties was not even proposed in the judgements of the 
Constitutional Court. This method would strongly intensify the problem caused by the 
overhanging seats and can therefore not be seen as a solution. A Parliament would be 
more unproportional than it already is as a result of the overhanging seats. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons given above, the occurrence of overhanging seats should be 
permitted without any measures of compensation. 
(f) Vacancies of overhanging seats 
Now, once an "overhang" has been seated in Parliament, the following question has 
to be answered: What happens when one of the cases enumerated in§ 48 I 1 BWahlG 
or section 55 of the Electoral Act 1993 occur during the legislative period? This 
means what steps should be taken when such a Member of Parliament dies for 
example? 
It could be possible to consider that another politician of the same political party 
could then occupy the affected seat or it could just remain vacant. The electoral 
provisions in Germany and New Zealand present differences concerning this question . 
In Germany,§ 48 I 1 BWahlG rnles that in the case where a Member of Parliament 
for example dies the vacant seat is occupied by a politician of the same political party. 
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This prov1s10n does not refer to overhanging seats, but just "normal" seats. A 
distinction between list seats and directly won electoral districts is not made. 
Nevertheless, it has occurred during seven legislature periods (1953, 1961, 1980, 
1983, 1987, 1990 and 1994) that vacant overhanging seats were occupied by list 
candidates of the affected party. 155 
The idea of another candidate taking the seat in question implicates a renouncement 
to the idea of the vote for an electoral district. Somebody who was not elected by the 
majority of the electors cannot replace a directly elected candidate. This would 
otherwise not comply with MMP. Thus, if an election of the successor did not take 
place, the seat has to remain vacant. 
The German Federal Constitutional Court, which had to decide about a 
constitutional complaint on this issue in 1998, argued similarly. The Court considered 
that § 48 I 1 BWahlG does not apply in these situations. Overhanging seats are 
"special" seats that, contrary to the previous legal practice, cannot be occupied by 
other candidates if these were not elected as substitutes for the directly elected 
candidate. A list candidate is not legitimized, as the affected party is not entitled to 
any more seats considering its party votes. The demanded election of a substitute 
could take place simultaneously in the general election or after the overhanging seat 
was vacated. 156 Due to the lack of such a provision things depend on the legislature to 
pass a provision ruling on this procedure. Therefore, overhanging seats cannot be 
considered as "secure" seats for a party for the whole legislative period.
157 
Interestingly, the Court said in addition that things would be tolerated how they 
were until the following federal elections that took place a few months after this 
decision was taken. The Court reasoned with the electoral legal practice used since 
1953 and the possible consequences that it could not estimate.
158 It is very likely that 
the latter was the heavier argument. The Court did not want to interfere in the political 
circumstances. 
155 BYerfG 2 BvC 28/96, 26 Febmary 1998 available at 
<http ://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/frames/cs l 9980226 _ 2bvc002896> (last accessed 30 September 
2003) 4. 
156 BVerfG 2 BvC 28/96, above, 4. 
157 BVerfG 2 BvC 28/96, above, 4. 
158 BVerfG 2 BvC 28/96, above, 4. 
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In New Zealand the Electoral Act 1993 handles the vacancies of seats in the House 
of Representatives in a more differentiating way than the BWahlG. Section 129 of the 
Electoral Act 1993 refers to the Members of Parliament representing electoral districts 
whereas section 134 refers to the party list seats. Section 129 anticipates what the 
German Federal Constitutional Court had considered five years later: a by-election 
takes place in order to fill the vacancy. Thus, the principle of democracy would be 
well observed when this provision is also applied for overhanging seats. 
Conclusion 
A vacated overhanging seat can only be reoccupied by a directly elected candidate. 
2 The system is quite complex 
Another demerit of our voting system is that numerous electors do not understand it. 
In 2000, a survey conducted in New Zealand revealed that 55 per cent of the 
respondents thought that FPP is more proportional than MMP. 159 Other surveys in the 
week after the election day in 1996 and 1999 revealed that 23 per cent (1996) and 30 
per cent (1999) of the electors did not know that the party vote is more important in 
deciding the number of MPs. These numbers increased thereafter. 160 It might not be 
advisable to expose the electors to two votes, which they can give to different political 
parties. These difficulties voters have can also be observed when looking at the use of 
splitting votes. In Germany, 20.1 per cent of all electors split their votes in the federal 
election of 1980, whereas the number increased to 25.4 per cent in 2002. If only the 
electors of small parties are taken into consideration, the numbers are 43.3 per cent in 
1980 and 49.6 per cent in 2002. 161 In the first MMP general election in New Zealand 
in 1996 37 per cent of the electors decided to split their votes; 
162 the number remained 
159 Hon Sir John Wallace "Reflections on Constitutional and other issues concerning our electoral 
system: the past and the future" in David Carter and Matthew Palmer (ed) Roles and Perspectives in 
the Law: Essays in Honour of Sir fvor Richardson (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2002) 297, 
319. ' 
160 Report of the MMP Review Committee Inquiry into the Review of MMP (Wellington, 2001) 90 
<http: //www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz//content/20/mmprevw.pdf> (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
161 Wahlbeteiligung und Stimmabgabe der Manner und Frauen nach dem Alter in Wahl zum 15. 
Deutschen Bundestag am 22. September 2002 (Bundeswahlleiter, Wiesbaden, 2002). 
162 Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation (Ashgate, 
Christchurch, 1998) 320. 
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almost constant in 1999 (35.2 per cent). 163 This is a surprisingly high percentage for 
the first elections under MMP. It can be expected that this number will increase over 
the years. Even if the use of splitting votes is generally increasing, there are still 
numerous electors of small parties who do not make use of it. 
Notwithstanding this, the advantages of MMP are so convincing that this problem 
has to be accepted. The informal campaigns undertaken in both countries also help to 
mitigate this problem. Additionally, it might be helpful to look at the placing of the 
party vote in the ballot papers. While in Germany, pursuant to § 4 BWahlG, the party 
vote is the second vote and the electorate vote the first one, in New Zealand, 
according to section 150 (3) of the Electoral Act 1993, this situation is reversed. This 
is preferable as the party vote is the most important. Electors who do not understand 
their electoral system might consider the first vote as the most important. 
3 The threshold of five per cent 
Pursuant to § 6 VI 1 BWahlG and section 191 (4) (a) of the Electoral Act 1993 a 
political party is only elected into Parliament when its party votes cross the threshold 
of five per cent or when, pursuant to§ 6 VI 1 BWahlG and section 191 (4) (b) of the 
Electoral Act 1993, it wins at least three electorates in Germany or one in New 
Zealand. The party vote is based on the proportional voting system, which aims to 
represent all electors in Parliament. This cannot be achieved if those votes for a party 
that did not reach five per cent of all votes do not influence its composition at all, if 
they are just lost. Also, it has to be considered that the threshold is even higher in 
practice. It could impede potential electors from voting for smaller parties, as these 
might not gain five per cent of all valid votes. Additionally, the foundation of any new 
parties is made difficult. This represents a breach of the principle of the equality of 
votes and is therefore problematic. 
On the other hand, this threshold has its justification. Without it, the political 
decision-making could be made very difficult or even impossible because of the lack 
163 Hon Sir John Wallace "Reflections on Constitutional and other issues concerning our electoral 
system: the past and the future" in David Carter and Matthew Palmer (ed) Roles a~,d Perspectives in 
the law: Essays in Honour of Sir Jvor Richardson (Y1ctona Umvers1ty Press, Wellmgton, 2002) 297, 
310. 
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of majorities. A proportional representation electoral system with a low or no 
threshold could result in having as many as 15 political parties in Parliament. 164 A 
good example for such a non-functioning Parliament occurred in the Republic of 
Weimar (1918 - 1933). It had experienced a double-digit number of political parties 
in its Parliament, and sixteen government coalitions between 1919 and 1928 165. The 
consequence was that an effective parliamentary work was made almost impossible. 
No majorities at all were reached in Parliament from 1929. The legislature was in 
cessation. In consequence, only emergency decrees were passed by the executive. 166 
These non-desirable experiences make it clear that Parliament cannot represent a total 
reflection of a society, that some restrictions must apply. Thus, a threshold of five per 
cent could be perceived as a reasonable measure to assure the efficiency of 
Parliament. And even if the establishment of new political parties becomes more 
difficult because of the threshold, there are still enough examples to justify it. 
Nevertheless, there is a question that needs to be dealt with. It is often discussed 
whether the threshold should be lowered to four per cent167 The arguments speaking 
in favour of this idea are that it could ensure that minor parties gain some 
representation and that it would reduce the number of "wasted" votes. 168 On the other 
hand, a higher limit reduces the risk of instability. Furthermore, there might be a 
better model for solution of the "wasted" votes. It should be analysed whether it is 
necessary in order to achieve a functioning Parliament that all the votes for political 
parties with fewer than the established threshold of the total amount of votes get lost. 
Two German citizens 169 have made the proposal that electors should have a "second 
choice" concerning their party votes on their ballot papers. It was proposed that the 
elector should enter the number 1 next to the name of his or her favourite political 
party and the number 2 besides the second favourite one. 170 In case the favoured party 
164 Jackson and McRobie, above, 320. 
l65 Wikipedia <http ://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weimarer_Republik> (last accessed 14 September 2003). 
166 Freistaat Thtiringen 
<http ://www. th ueringen. de/ de/ index. asp ?un ten= http://www. thueringen. de/ de/ lzt/po Ii tik/po Ii ts ys/wei ma 
ne/content.html> (last accessed 30 September 2003). 
167 See for example Report of the MMP Review Committee lnqui,y into the Review of MMP 
(Wellington, 2001) 4 7 <http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz//content/20/mmprevw.pdf> (last accessed 
25 September 2003) and Royal Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" 
[1986-87] IX AJHR H.3 67. 
168 MMP Review Committee, above, 48. 
169 Dr. Bjorn Benken and Gerhard Kottschlag. 
110 Wahlreform.de <http://www.wahlrefom1.de/presse.htm> (last accessed 14 September 2003). 
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does not pass the threshold, the elector's second choice should automatically be 
counted. The authors say that this way the efficiency of Parliament could be 
guaranteed besides ensuring the principle of the equality of votes. Also, Parliament 
would really represent the society's will, as tactical thoughts when voting would not 
be necessary anymore. 171 
When considering this idea, the possible problems related to it have to be faced. 
First, the idea would not represent a solution in those cases where the elector prefers 
political parties that both do not pass the threshold. Therefore a longer list of the 
preferred parties could be considered. But the practicability and clearness of an 
election are also very important. It could provoke a lot of confusion if electors were 
confronted with ballot papers requiring them to make a list of their most preferred 
political parties. This problem would even arise if the proposal is followed and the 
electors only have to fill in two numbers for their party vote and one cross for their 
electorate vote. Electors already often do not understand the reason for having two 
votes; three would not make things better. Thus, the clearness of an election could be 
risked when following this proposal. Also, it has to be seen that such a procedure 
could be difficult to carry out in practice. The alternative vote should be counted 
automatically, the authors say. This has to be realised somehow, but in our modem era 
an accordant technology could be developed for sure. 
Therefore, the remaining problem is the clearness of the elections. On the other 
hand, this problem could be lessened by a suitable campaign informing the electoral 
population about the changes. The benefits from it would be the possibility of a very 
strict consideration of the principle of the equality of votes and the avoidance of 
tactical thoughts when voting. Nevertheless, it seems more reasonable to let electors 
mark their ballot papers with just two numbers for their party votes instead of five or 
even more. It is likely that most electors would choose a larger party as their second 
choice when their first choice is a smaller one. 
Therefore it has to be concluded that the "two-choice" proposal should be followed in 
order to ensure both a fi.mctioning Parliament and the compliance with the principle of 
the equality of votes. 
171 Wahlreform.de, above. 
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E Consequences of the Introduction of MMP for New Zealand 
Political circumstances are often not predictable. Whereas the German public does, 
despite some insignificant exceptions, not question the appliance of MMP, a wave of 
doubt has overcome New Zealand's society. 
What are the factual changes that took place in New Zealand after the introduction 
of MMP? For example, it is considerable that the average vote won by a majority 
party decreased significantly with MMP. Whereas this average was 41.7 per cent of 
the total amount of votes during the FPP period, it only was 33.5 per cent after the 
introduction of MMP. 172 
It is unlikely that major parties win the absolute majority in Parliament. Thus, the 
composition of Parliament with an estimated total of five or six parties gives the 
choice between coalition or minority governments or a minority coalition.
173 Among 
the population of New Zealand, the fear has raised that minority governments or 
minority coalitions could not present the stable conditions they were accustomed to 
with the FPP electoral system.
174 But minority governments are not necessarily 
. 1r 
unstable. They have often lasted a considerable time in many countnes. ) 
Furthermore, the examples given by the National and Labour/ Alliance Governments 
do not justify the apprehension that MMP could lead to ineffective govemments.
176 
Coalition governments are likely to act effectively and implement their policies. 
These just sometimes need to be submitted to modifications in order to gain a 
majority in Parliament. 
177 Also, the electors should not overestimate the requirement 
that potential coalition partners are viable and available. In 1998, it was predicted that 
the principal two potential coalition partners, Alliance and New Zealand First, were 
unlikely to constitute a coalition because of personal antipathies concerning the major 
parties their leaders had broken with.
178 But only four years later, the Progressive 
172 Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation (Ashgate, 
Christchurch, 1998) 320. 
173 Jackson and McRobie, above, 321. 
174 Jackson and McRobie above, 321. 
175 Jackson and McRobie, above, 323. 
176 Hon Sir John Wallace "Reflections on Constitutional and other issues concerning our electoral 
system: the past and the future" in David Carter and Matthew Palmer ( ed) Roles and Perspectives in 
the Law: Essays in Honour of Sir !vor Richardson (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2002) 297, 
307. 
177 Wallace, above, 297, 307. 
178 Jackson and McRobie, above, 322. 
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Coalition, which split from Alliance, entered a coalition with the Labour Party. The 
new electoral system can result in circumstances as stable as with FPP .
179 
Another significant change for New Zealanders is the circumstance of the party list 
mechanism of MMP. The electors have no influence on the candidates put forward on 
the party lists. Nevertheless, the numerous merits related to the list MPs have to be 
regarded. The Maori representation in Parliament increased under MMP, resulting in a 
broadly proportional representation. This circumstance is due both to the list 
representation and the increased number of Maori electorates. 
180 Also, the 
representation of women in Parliament has increased since the introduction of MMP. 
Even before the introduction of the new electoral system, New Zealand ranked eighth 
in an international comparison for women's representation. This number has increased 
markedly since then. At the last FPP election, women occupied 21.6 per cent of the 
seats in Parliament. Under MMP, this number increased to 29.2 per cent in 1996 and 
further to 30.8 per cent in 1999. 181 Therefore, the nature and diversity of the New 
Zealand society is better reflected in Parliament than under any previous electoral 
system. 182 
III CONCLUSION 
The Mixed System of (Simple) Majority Vote and Proportional Representation 
(MMP) electoral method guarantees a proportional representation in Parliament 
besides giving the electors the possibility of influencing the personal composition of 
it. Other voting systems, such as the Single Transferable Vote (STY), Supplementary 
Member (SM) or First-Past-the-Post (FPP) are not preferable in comparison to MMP. 
Numerous mathematicians have been working on the development of an accurate 
mathematical formula to calculate the number of seats that belong to the political 
parties according to the party vote. It was demonstrated in 1978 that an error-free 
formula cannot be developed. The Sainte Lague formula, which applies in New 
179 Jackson and McRobie, above, 323. 
180 Report of the MMP Review Committee Inquiry into the Review of MMP (Wellington, 2001) 41 
<http: //www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz//content/20/mmprevw.pdf> (last accessed 25 September 2003). 
181 MMP Review Committee, above, 43 . 
182 MMP Review Committee, above, 46. 
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Zealand, is the method to be preferred as it presents the lowest possibility of 
unsatisfactory results. This formula should substitute the Hare/Niemeyer formula in 
Germany. 
The occurrence of overhanging seats changes the proportional composition of 
Parliament. Even so, measures of compensation for overhanging seats should not be 
taken. As currently occurs, the overhanging seats should be granted as additional to 
the regular seats in Parliament. If an overhanging seat is vacated during a legislative 
period, only a candidate who was directly elected can reoccupy it. 
It is recommended that Germany allocates the party vote as the first vote in the 
ballot papers and the electorate vote as the second, as in New Zealand. Electors who 
do not understand their voting system might think that the first vote is the more 
important. 
The current threshold of five per cent represents a deviance from the 
proportionality. Political parties that do not obtain five per cent or more of all valid 
votes are not represented in Parliament. This threshold is necessary in order to assure 
a functioning Parliament. Nevertheless, the votes for political parties that did not pass 
the threshold do not need to get "wasted". Electors should be given a second choice 
concerning their party votes. If the preferred political party does not pass the 
threshold, the voters' second choice should automatically be counted. 
The MMP voting system can result in political circumstances as stable as the FPP 
system. It has increased the representation in Parliament of minorities such as Maori. 
Also, women's representation has increased since the introduction of the MMP 
system in New Zealand. 
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